the Opportunity costs of institutional choice 
Lecturer:Professor Xia Yeliang, Peking University 
Discussants:Professor Yi Xianrong, CASS;Professor Liu Junning, Cathy Institute;Prof. Mao Yushi, Unirule Institute of Economics;Prof. Zhang Shuguang, Unirule Institute of Economics;Prof. Sheng Hong, Unirule Institute of Economics 
 
 
Professor Xia contends that the core objective of social system is to maximize the welfare of a society. However, this maximizing process relies on its agents of institutional selection. In most countries, the decision rights are excluded to a small group of people. These groups are said to represent the interests of people. However, in most cases, it is not true. For the first thing, policy will be biased due to the pressure of interests groups. On the other hand, there will be a clash in value system which means that the preference of people and rulers are different. This clash will lead to an unbalanced competition of power. And the defects of institutions are easily been frozen.

He raised four conclusions, the first one is that the opportunity costs of institutional selection is very large and irreversible. Thus it should be based on the consensus of people. Third, there should be a trial and error system to allow the existence of extra-institution; fourth, there should be check system in institution.